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Tragedy  
 





“Wem nichts Menschliches fremd 
wäre, dem wäre das Menschliche 






Every order lies on the claim or pretension to give itself as an accomplished realm, i.e. as a 
closed scene which is capable to give shape, orientation and sense to the totality of 
elements embraced by it. Yet, from the same operation of ordering, a paradox soon arises, 
in that no order can avoid its contingent genealogy, that means: it cannot avoid the fact that, 
in enclosing and including something, it must simultaneously exclude something else, 
which, therefore, can always challenge and threaten its stability or total “delimitation”. In 
this sense, that which is excluded can be seen as an alien element, which structurally 
prevents order from a definite closure and thus keeps it in a permanent (historical and non-
dialectisable) movement.  
Now, what I would like to convey in my following reflections is that this dynamics of 
impossible closure of order, given to a non-appropriable alienness, is exactly the one 
operative in the realms of translation and tragedy, so that, once we carefully investigate 
these realms, we may dare to affirm that saying that orders are unclosed scenes is as much 
true as to say that they are constantly “in translation”, always “in tragedy”. 
 
 
0. Introduction: the slippery ground 
 
Dealing with translation and tragedy means moving on a same slippery 
ground; it means facing a peculiar scene of closure inhabited by a paradox: on 
one side, translation and tragedy claim a closure of sense, an appropriation of 
sense; on the other side, this same scene displays the impossibility of being 
closed, because that which sneaks into the scene is an intruder that cannot be 
appropriated, a disturbing element that can neither be forced nor reduced 
into the structured order: for this reason, it can be called an “out of (the) 
                                                          
1 [“To the one whom nothing human would be alien, to this same one would be alien the human itself”] B. 
WALDENFELS, Verfremdung der Moderne. Phänomenologische Grenzgänge, Wallstein Verlag, 
Göttingen 2001, 8.  
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order”: an alien, a stranger2. In other words, addressing translation and tragedy 
means dealing with the inevitable alienness which inhabits every order in its 
innermost core.  
That which is here meant by closure and its impossibility due to an alien, 
requires, at this point, a more detailed explanation. The most appropriate way 
of clarifying these “concepts” is by applying them to our two issues: translation 




1. Translation: the originary3 alienness 
 
The scene of translation can be – more or less – described as follows: on one 
side, there is my own tongue or culture which is familiar, common to me; and, 
on the other side, there is, opposite to mine, the stranger(’s) tongue/culture4. 
Translating means to make understandable in my own/proper codes what is 
otherwise not understandable (unfamiliar to me). Very simply described: 
translating a stranger(’s) culture means reducing it to what I can understand 
under my own/proper: and that explains also why we speak about 
“appropriation”. However, in this operation of translation, which reduces the 
alien to what is familiar to me, haven’t I missed (to “translate”) the most 
peculiar element of what I translate, namely: haven’t I missed the being alien 
(alienness) of what is alien, the unfamiliarity of what is unfamiliar? This 
element is not secondary if we take into account the fact that, maybe, the 
reasons of the alien take their strength, significance and justification exactly 
from that same place which appears unfamiliar/alien to us, and that we reduce 
or lose in/by the translation process. An example of the peculiarity of the 
alienness of the alien can be given if we analyze the process of translating 
stranger’s proverbs (or idiomatic expressions) which make sense only in the 
stranger’s tongue, which – again – take their significance from that same place 
that appears stranger (alien) to us. As soon as, by translating, we remove their 
strange(r)ness (alienness), we “risk” to remove them as such.  
Leaving this specific example aside, a crucial question arises: how to 
translate cultures avoiding their reduction? The question at stake is how to 
deal with the alienness of the alien without dissolving it. “C’est cela qu’il s’agit 
de penser” writes Nancy “et donc de pratiquer: sinon, l’étrangeté de l’étranger 
                                                          
2 In this essay, by alien and alienness (as well as by stranger and strange(r)ness) I am trying to convey 
what the German language does by Fremde and Fremdheit and French by étranger and étrangeté. 
3 I use “originary” in order to differentiate it from “original”, to express the shades of meaning that exist in 
French between “originaire”, “originel” and “original”; in German between “ursprünglich”, “originell” and 
“original”; in Italian between “originario” and “originale”. 
4 For a general understanding of the concepts of own and alien, I refer to the precious investigations of 
Bernhard Waldenfels. In particular the section, Eigenes und Fremdes, in B. WALDENFELS, Der Stachel 
des Fremden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, 43-79. 
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est résorbée avant qu’il ait franchi le seuil, il ne s’agit plus d’elle”5. The 
German thinker Bernhard Waldenfels, more generally, asks:  
 
How or from where can we speak about the alien (Fremde) without 
robbing it of its alienness (Fremdheit)?6  
 
Of course, in order to understand we must translate! Nevertheless, this 
does not prevent us from looking at translation in a different way, namely as a 
response to the alien and not as an overcoming of it. In other words, 
translation is not a final re-solution/dis-solution of the alien, where the alien 
element is considered as something transitory that can and must be overcome; 
on the contrary, translation can be approached as a process that can never 
fully “reach” and appropriate the alien. Nancy’s words convey perfectly the 
disturbing element represented by the alien:  
 
[…] sa venue ne cesse pas: il continue à venir, et elle ne cesse pas d’être à 
quelque égard une intrusion.7  
 
On this basis, the alien element demands a “permanent work of 
translation”8, an effort that becomes aware of its ontological incompleteness. 
Instead of claiming its conformity/faithfulness to the original, and viewing the 
work through the alien as a temporary state – at the end of which the access to 
the original is to be achieved – the act of translation accepts the origin(al) as an 
alien and realizes the impossibility of regaining an immediate access to it9. The 
alien is no longer the intermediate state that, once overcome through 
“translation”, enables us to close the circle, to establish a full appropriation of 
sense; rather it is what keeps the circle open and therefore requires a constant 
process of translating as response. In this sense Waldenfels writes:  
 
                                                          
5 J.-L. NANCY, L’intrus, Galilée, Paris 2000, 12. The same point is stressed by Waldenfels: “If the alien 
(Fremde) – which has its essence in the ‘confirmable accessibility of the original inaccessible 
(bewährbaren Zugänglichkeit des original Unzugänglich)’ (Husserliana I, 144) – were that which is simply 
accessible and belonging-to (schlichtweg zugänglich und zugehörig), it would no longer be what it is: an 
alien” (B. WALDENFELS, Der Stachel, 7). The translations from Waldenfels’ texts, from German, are 
mine.  
6 B. WALDENFELS, Topographie des Fremden. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 1, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1997, 50. 
7 J.-L. NANCY, L’intrus, 11-12. 
8 See R. IVEKOVIC, De la traduction permanente (Nous sommes en traduction) / On permanent 
Translation (We are in translation), in Transeuropéennes, 22, 2002, 121-143.  
9 For a deepening regarding the theme of the alienness in/of the origin see the work by the Italian 
phenomenologist F. CIARAMELLI, La distruzione del desiderio. Il narcisismo nell’epoca del consumo di 
massa, Dedalo, Bari 2000 (in particular the following sections: 87-93; 106-115). 
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The request/summons (Aufforderung) of the alien does not have a sense 
and does not follow any rule, rather it provokes the sense by upsetting the 
present sense references (Sinnbezüge) and by breaking the rule systems.10 
 
Therefore, the only way of relating to the alien, accomplishing to avoid its 
reduction, is the response imposed by the appeal/disturb coming from the 
same alien. Waldenfels calls it the event of responsivity (Responsivität). He 
writes:  
 
The alien becomes what it is in no other place than the event of 
responding (Ereignis des Antwortens); this means that it never allows to be 
completely and univocally defined. That which we answer to surmounts 
always that which we give in/as the answer (zur Antwort). What it is alien does 
not allow to be answered like a definite question or solved like a definite 
problem.11  
 
Thus, in Waldenfels’ opinion, as alien must be taken  
 
[…] that to which we answer (das, worauf wir antworten) and inevitably 
have to answer, therefore as request/summons (Aufforderung), challenge 
(Herausforderung), stimulus (Anreiz), call (Anruf), appeal/demand 
(Anspruch) […] All looking at (Hinsehen) and listening to (Hinhören) would 
be an ‘answering (antwortendes) looking at and listening to’; all speaking and 
acting would be a kind of ‘answering’ behavior.12 
 
Viewed like a process of responding, translation can be really described as 
a scene of closure which leaves space for the open, a will to appropriation 
which undertakes the inevitable route of expropriation, a will to power which 
is submitted to the trial of fragility.  
This statute of translation does not regard only the sphere of the alien “out 
of the” own, but rather a form of alienness involves also our own identity. 
This alienness manifests itself as impossibility to have immediate access to an 
original and pure self. In other words, what I think to be familiar and 
common to me, what I call my own culture and my own self, to which I 
identify myself and think to have immediate access, is not at all so. Instead, it 
is a product of a basic and constant translation: a making familiar – an 
appropriation (Aneignung) – of something which is originally alien and 
therefore that expropriates (enteignet) me from the possessing of myself. 
Discovering this original alienness is to become aware of the fact that a 
                                                          
10 B. WALDENFELS, Topographie, 52.  
11 Ibidem. 
12 Ibid., 109. See as well B. WALDENFELS, Antwortregister, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, 269. 
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transparent ownness is only a phantom of fulfillment of desire13 of possessing 
myself totally and not the original and actual ground where I move from. This 
sense of alienness in the own is what we can read in the Dionysiac of 
Nietzsche, in the Unheimlich of Freud, in Merleau-Ponty’s description of the 
experience of delay in the living-present, in the posteriority of the anterior of 
Lévinas, in Derrida’s supplement of origin, and in the whole work of 
Waldenfels14. This last author shows clearly that in every crucial experience in 
which I identify myself as my own self, the alienness is present like a goad 
(Stachel)15:  
 
My experience of time goes back to the original experience of my birth, to 
an original past, a ‘past which has never been present’ (Merleau-Ponty), and 
that is never my present as I always come too late in order to be able to catch 
it in flagranti […] Also the name that I have and I hear calling, I received it 
from others […]; it has been spoken to me before I spoke to others. […] The 
fright (Erschrecken) in front of one’s own image (Bild), the one that comes 
from the mirror or from a photo and that in extreme cases can lead to suicide 
attempts, would be inconceivable if ‘I’ were simply ‘I’ or if I could always fully 
return back to myself (zu mir selbst zurückkehren). I encounter myself under 
the gaze/glance of the others (ich begegne mir im Blick der Anderen).16 
  
The primacy and irreducibility of the alien is what the translation 
experiences as a scene that cannot be closed, a scene that re-proposes itself 
both out of the subject and inside it17, or more appropriately expressed: the 
alien proposes itself out of the subject – and does it always in a problematic 
way – only because inside the subject, in the sphere of the own, at the origin, 
this same alien abides18.  
                                                          
13 See F. CIARAMELLI, La distruzione, 55-83. 
14 In order to achieve a deep confrontation with this thinker, see his latest work: B. WALDENFELS, 
Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phänomenologie – Psychoanalyse – Phänomenotechnik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
a. M. 2002. For a critical introduction and discussion regarding his thinking, see in German: M. FISCHER, 
H.-D. GONDEK, B. LIEBSCH (edited by), Vernunft im Zeichen des Fremden. Zur Philosophie von 
Bernhard Waldenfels, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2001; in English: F. DALLMAYR, On Bernhard 
Waldenfels, in Social Research, 56, 3, 1989, 681-712; in French: F. CIARAMELLI, L’inquiétante 
étrangeté de l’origine, in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 96, 3, 1998, 512-524; in Italian (my article): 
F.G. MENGA, La “passione della risposta. Sulla fenomenologia dell’estraneo di Bernhard Waldenfels, in 
aut aut, 316-317, 2003, 209-237.  
15 See the work of B. WALDENFELS, Der Stachel. 
16 B. WALDENFELS, Topographie, 30-31. 
17 See J. KRISTEVA, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, Fayard, Paris 1988. 
18 See B. WALDENFELS, Der Stachel, 53. This is what Ciaramelli conveys as well: “The direct 
inaccessibility to the alien as alien is not the depriving modification of a more original immediate 
accessibility to the own. Far from presupposing the preliminary appropriation of the own, the immediate 
inaccessibility of the alien shakes the presumed independence of the own, its immediate imaginary 
coincidence with itself” (F. CIARAMELLI, L’inospitalità dell’origine. Il fascino e la minaccia 
dell’“estraneo” tra fenomenologia e psicoanalisi, in G. Borrelli and F.C. Papparo [edited by], Nella 
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The consequences of this thought could be relevant on an inter-cultural 
level: in fact, if there is no full experience of the own-ness at origins, if what is 
called own-ness is the work through and with an original alienness, what fails is 
the presumption of having a solid basis which one stands upon and from 
which one thinks to perform a translation that regards only the other’s culture. 
By that it is not negated the existence of what is called “own culture”, but it is 
only expressed that the access to one’s own culture always involves in its 
deepest roots a relation to alienness. This is not difficult to demonstrate if we 
agree upon the fact that there is nobody’s culture which can claim an isolated 
development for itself, namely without relating to other(’s) cultures19. Of 
course, again and again we see examples where communities or societies 
strongly affirm an own pure origin in which they only would be involved. 
What is yet very suspicious is that each of these affirmations has been and is 
always accompanied by hostility towards the alien, xenophobia. Why does the 
absolute and privileged affirmation of one’s own culture, legitimized only by 
the exhibition of a pure and exclusive origin – that must be consequently 
immediately accessible – always slip into the hate towards the alien? Isn’t it 
maybe because this xénon (alien) is that which inhabits the original core of 
own-ness and therefore, by hindering a complete affirmation of the own, must 
be at any cost repressed?20  
 
 
2. Antigone: the tragedy of order  
 
The scene described above reappears, in its own way, in the context of 
tragedy: tragedy is the most peculiar “place” in which the irreducibility of the 
opened relationship between the own and the alien is displayed. There could 
not be a better instance than Sophocles’ Antigone to show this. On one side, 
there is Creon with his own reasons, to which Antigone’s reasons appear 
strange in a radical sense: so strange that they turn to be non-sense, non-
reasons. On the other side, Antigone feels the same towards Creon. Here the 
scheme seen in translation reappears: as soon as an own-character translates 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dispersione del vero. I filosofi: la ragione, la follia, Filema, Napoli 1998, 237) (the translation into English 
of Ciaramelli’s texts is mine).  
19 See B. WALDENFELS, Fra le culture, italian transl. by F.G. Menga, in aut aut, 313-314, 2003, 64-77. 
20 To this problem the intellectual effort of Rada Ivekovic is very enlightening. Concerning the issue of 
communities affirming their own identity against the alien, she writes: “La formation des nouvelles 
identités est donc produite et accompagnée par de nouveaux récits permettant l’auto-représentation, la 
refondation, l’homogénéisation communautaire. L’origine (à partir de l’autre) doit donc être dissimulée. 
[…] C’est ainsi que se construit un sujet (politique) violente. Il se donne une identité fermée, autistique, 
refusant l’échange et la différence […] une identité objective […] qui exige le sacrifice. Le sacrifice de 
l’autre” (R. IVEKOVIC, L’autisme communautaire, in Transeuropéennes, 9, 1996-97, 68-69). For an 
enriching deepening regarding this dynamic of exclusion see the beautiful essay by C. CASTORIADIS, 
Réflextions sur le racisme (1987), in Le monde morcelé. Les carrefours du Labyrinthe III, Éd. du Seuil, 
Paris 1990, 25-38.  
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the alien’s reasons, it fails to translate the “place” of the alien, the place from 
which these reasons take their strength and significance. This “place” ends up 
being totally reduced; therefore it turns to be a non-place, and accordingly, the 
sense that sustains these reasons turns to be a non-sense. If this description 
has a certain legitimacy to be followed, then the tragedy of Antigone, like the 
“tragedy” of translation, is what shows the dilemma of the reduction of the 
alien. The reduction here is due to what Hegel would call the one-sidedness21: 
the reasons of the own reduce those of the alien/other as soon as the first one 
relates to the second one. There is no mediation between the own and the 
alien; there is no third place in which the two can find a synthesis. (The 
development of Hegel’s thought on tragedy is different from the one just 
stated; we will have a confrontation with it later. For the moment is more 
appropriate to leave Hegel aside and proceed with our discourse.)  
According to the given description of tragedy, we are asked not to solve, 
and therefore dissolve, too quickly the opposite represented poles. The 
relationship of alienness between Antigone and Creon is exactly what makes 
the tragic of the tragedy; it is what constitutes the up-to-dateness of the tragedy 
at any time. Not giving a solution means, maybe, also that we have to resist the 
temptation of quickly taking the side of Antigone. Perhaps Sophocles is trying 
to convey that we are dealing with a tragedy and not with a case of “problem-
solving”.   
I will trace three instances that stress this tragic core of the tragedy: 
A) Creon and Antigone, considered for themselves, are both right: they 
are trying to act following what they think is reasonable and good. Hegel’s 
analysis conveys this when he speaks about the opposition between two ethical 
principles: Creon/State, Antigone/family. From here it comes the notion of 
tragedy as a conflict between two “rights” or “truths” of equal significance. The 
tragic is created by the fact that – as J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet write – 
“des deux attitudes religieuses que l’Antigone met en conflit aucune ne saurait 
en elle-même être la bonne sans faire à l’autre sa place, sans reconnaître cela 
même qui la borne et la conteste”22. This quotation explains also why this 
tragedy cannot be other than tragic: similarly to what we saw happening in 
translation, in tragedy, starting from an alienness that is to perceive out of the 
own, we end up realizing that an alienness involves the own in its inner being. 
In the specific case of Antigone, Creon/State is trying to repress 
Antigone/family through the prohibition of sepulture, where however – and 
here the alien irrupts in the own – family and sepulture are constitutive of the 
                                                          
21 See G.F.W. HEGEL, Aesthetik (Part 3, III, chapter 3, iii. a) and his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion (II. 3. a). Of course we cannot forget the famous pages dedicated to tragedy in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit (Reason: C. c; Spirit: A. a and b; Religion: B. c) and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
(I. 2. b. 3). 
22 J.-P. VERNANT, P. VIDAL-NAQUET, Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne, t. I, La Découverte, Paris 
1986, 34. 
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State. This leads to the following paradox: the State, in order to “promote” 
itself, has to repress the family-part of itself: as a matter of fact, the family’s 
burial right is, at the same time, the cornerstone of the State, for it represents 
the preservation of memory distinctive of a rule-based society. The same 
scene can be described on Antigone’s side: Antigone/family is trying to 
“repress” Creon/State, which is however an inner part of the family: in fact, we 
should not forget that Antigone, in order to defend the family rights by 
burying Polynices, has to repress (in psychoanalytical terms) the fact that 
Polynices, the aggressor of the city, is responsible for the death of her other 
brother, Eteocles, who is – and this is very important – the defender of the 
State. Is it only by chance that Sophocles puts into scene a family in which one 
brother threatens the State, the other defends it and a sister ends up somehow 
repressing the State-part of the family (Eteocles) in order to defend (in the 
name of Polynices) the same family? I believe not.  
On the basis of what it has just been said, we are maybe asked not to 
reduce the tragedy that here takes place, not to hurry in appropriating and 
therefore dominating the “perturbing” scene. We should not simply say that 
Antigone is right and that Creon is a tyrant. As George Steiner notices:  
 
If Creon was only or essentially a tyrant … if he did not incarnate an 
ethical principle […] he would not be worthy of Antigone’s challenge.23 
  
It is an exercise of delay the one that tragedy is asking us to undertake, the 
same one that we discovered as indispensable in translation, and that we will 
see also “working” in fiction.  
B) At this point it is necessary to say something more about the concept of 
one-sidedness. One-sidedness means narrowness; both Creon and Antigone 
do not see any kind of exception to their standpoint24: for Creon the 
opposition friend/enemy is shaped by a strict political category: “good” is what 
serves the city, “bad” is what harms the city; for Antigone the only faithfulness 
is the one due to the dead. As a matter of fact her simplification of faithfulness 
causes her to repress the faithfulness due to the wedding promise to Haemon. 
And this up to the extreme limit that makes her say: “O tomb, my bridal-bed” 
(v. 892)25. This affirmation is striking: a renunciation of the love of a living man 
for the love of the tomb. This remark makes Antigone’s world-view appear as 
narrow-minded as the one of Creon. Paul Ricoeur, whose thorough analysis 
                                                          
23 G. STEINER, Antigones, Clarendon, Oxford 1984, 39. 
24 Paul RICOEUR analyzes Antigone tragedy underlining exactly the factor of one-sidedness in both 
Antigone and Creon. It is very enriching to read the section Le tragique de l’action in Soi-même comme un 
autre, Éd. du Seuil, Paris 1990, 281-290 (in part. 284-285).  
25 I quote from the following English translation: SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in ID., The Three Theban Plays, 
engl. trans. by Robert Fagles, Penguin Books, New York 1982. 
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cannot avoid to notice the perturbing exclamation of Antigone, confirms our 
point of view:  
 
La stratégie de simplification […] que scelle l’unique allégeance aux morts 
[…] ne rend pas Antigone moins inhumaine que Créon.26 
  
C) Leaving aside the “main characters”, it is equally important to observe 
the attitude of the Chorus, which is supposed to lead the plot and announce 
the pivotal points of the tragedy. How does the Chorus “behave”? It seems 
that it cannot do anything but re-launch the tragedy. Thus, no closure but 
iteration of the dilemma; no mediation but underlining of the tragic in the 
tragedy. Here are some instances: 
1. In the “Ode to the Sun” (vs. 100-110) – where the sun is described as 
the eye that dominates, that is not supposed to be limited by the distinctive 
partiality of human vision – it is essential to notice how this same dominating 
eye is not able to propose any solution, rather it can only re-iterate the tragic. 
Speaking about Polynices’ action, this objective non-human eye, which views 
everything from above, expresses only the presence of amphilógon (v. 111), 
namely: “two-faces arguments”27. It stops itself by attesting the opposition 
between two one-sided arguments. 
2. The same oscillation is proposed in the “Ode to Man” (vs. 332-375), 
where the human being itself is defined as a source of tragic disputes, and 
therefore impossible to be faced by a conceptual frame. Only tragedy is the 
adequate scene that can embrace the human being’s universe. The words of 
the Chorus are intense:  
 
Numberless wonders/terrible wonders walk the world but none of them 
can be compared to man (Pollà tà deinà kudén anthrópon deinóteron pélei) 
(vs. 333-335).28 
 
The Chorus uses a word which is often present in the text: deinon, a 
wonder which indicates, at the same time, a terrible wonder. Men are 
dominated by this deinon. Thus, no fixed ground but oscillation is the most 
appropriate form to “define” the human situation in its inner being29. And this 
                                                          
26 See P. RICOEUR, Soi-même, 285. The analysis of Ricoeur recalls the “masterpiece” of M.C. 
NUSSBAUM, The fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press 1986. 
27 See ibid., 286 (Ricoeur refers to Nussbaum’s analysis in The fragility, 71). 
28 I have slightly modified the English translation to which I refer. 
29 In this sense we cannot avoid referring to the closeness between the deinon – as wonder which inhabits 
man, and which is at the same time something terrible – and the Unheimlich (uncanny) of Freud: something 
which is at the same time the most familiar (heimisch; Heim is home) and the most secret/hidden 
(heimlich); better said: the deepest inner-ness of the familiar, by turning to be the most terrible and alien, is 
that which is uncanny (un-heim-lich).  
FERDINANDO G. MENGA 
 412
wonder recalls alienness: an instability that dominates man and that, 
consequently, requires a constant response from it30.  
3. A last remark that stresses the “openness” of Sophocles’ tragedy is 
represented by the confrontation of the arguments sustained by Creon and his 
son, Haemon, who takes the side of Antigone. What it is very important to 
notice is the position of the Chorus. It considers both arguments right:  
 
[to Creon] You’d do well, my lord, if he’s speaking to the point, to learn 
from him [and turning to Haemon] and you, my boy, from him. You both are 
talking sense (vs. 724-25). 
 
These remarks bring us to agree with Hegel’s analysis which defines the 
tragic as the relationship between Creon’s and Antigone’s one-sided 
arguments. Nevertheless, we must not assent to the synthesis, the mediation 
that Hegel proposes: the overcoming-dissolution (Aufhebung) of tragedy. If in 
Hegel there is opposition and tragedy, there is such only on the basis of a 
presupposition: that this opposition is resolved into a mediation, in a synthesis 
of the Spirit. What comes into play is a third place which goes beyond the 
opposition and, consequently, out of the tragedy. Yet, is it possible to go 
out/beyond the tragedy? Is it possible to claim the existence of a third place? 
Hegel thinks so: his third place, which resolves/dissolves tragedy and 
opposition, is called the Spirit (Geist). The Spirit is capable of containing the 
opposition through a mediation/overcoming (Aufhebung) of it. Spirit is the 
Absolute. 
 A possible translation towards a third place “between” own and alien is 
given according to Hegel. Hegel’s scheme, brought to its essential elements, 
appears as follows: the own is the consciousness that perceives; the alien is the 
object “out there” which is perceived; the third place is the Spirit that contains 
both and that therefore overcomes the opposition between the two. Is this 
place real/effective – wirklich? A possible answer can be extrapolated from 
Hegel’s core-work, Phenomenology of Spirit. It must not be forgotten, as 
Hegel himself writes, that phenomenology of spirit is “the Science of the 
experience which consciousness goes through”31. The Spirit is somehow tied 
to the experience of consciousness: however, not in the sense that it is 
reduced to consciousness, but in the sense that the Spirit recognizes itself – 
as/in what it is – through a progressive enlarging of the capacity of 
consciousness, the only one in which it effectively can recognize itself. Thus, 
the Spirit manifests itself through a step-by-step growing appropriation 
                                                          
30 B. Waldenfels considers the statute of wonder in terms of an appeal from the alien which claims for a 
response. See B. WALDENFELS, Topographie, 104. In this regard we should not forget also the great 
Cuban writer, A. Carpentier, who has devoted many of his pieces to the theme of wonder, the maravilloso: 
see his Concierto barroco and El reino de este mundo.  
31 G.W.F. HEGEL, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller, Clarendon, Oxford 1977, 21. 
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acquired by consciousness: better said, consciousness realizes, step by step, to 
be more and more the Spirit that manifests itself through consciousness. This 
progressive process could be defined as a growing appropriation of the own at 
the expenses of the alien: in fact, at every stage of the experience of 
consciousness (at every configuration of the Spirit) a new opposition is 
manifested and at the end is overcome by the Spirit. At the end, an alien is 
“naturalized”, appropriated. The result of this is a larger capacity of 
consciousness in recognizing the Spirit as what it is – a closer-to-what-it-is 
recognition of the Spirit through consciousness. The completion of this path 
has already appeared within the lines, consciousness will overcome every 
opposition and will totally recognize itself as the Spirit; or better, the Spirit, 
“playing itself as consciousness”, will be totally coincident to itself, and 
therefore the difference between consciousness and Spirit will disappear32.  
Now, the effective existence of this third place can be legitimated only if a 
final mediation/appropriation can be displayed33: a place where the Spirit 
dominates without opposition or intrusion of an alien. If the Spirit could not 
“guarantee” (and give proof of) the effective existence of this place where it 
would be totally fulfilled and where no opposition would be present, that 
would mean that the Spirit could not be distinguished from consciousness, 
and its recognition through consciousness would be a mere presumption. In 
other words, it would not be so: that the Spirit would recognize itself through 
consciousness, rather it would be a mere game of consciousness playing the 
role of the Spirit (that, as such, reveals itself as a dream of consciousness!). Is 
Hegel able to show it? No, he is not. Nevertheless, the fact that he cannot 
acquire the fulfillment of the Spirit does not prevent him from presupposing 
it. And that is what is all about: Hegel jumps out of the opposition and closes 
the infinite tale of the Spirit only by presupposing an all-evident, immediate, 
original presence of the Spirit; in other words, only by presupposing an origin 
in which the Spirit is immediately present to itself without any kind of 
opposition34. We could say as well: for Hegel at the beginning was the own, 
                                                          
32 In Hegel’s words: “The immediate existence of the Spirit, consciousness, contains the two moments of 
knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing. Since it is in this element [of consciousness] that Spirit 
develops itself and explicates its moments, these moments contain that antithesis, and they all appear as 
shapes of consciousness. The Science of this pathway is the Science of the experience which consciousness 
goes through […] Now, although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the ‘I’ and its object, 
it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an 
activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. 
When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence […] Being is 
then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the ‘I’, it is 
self-like or the Notion. With this, the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded” (ibidem). 
33 In this sense Hegel writes: “Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the 
end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the 
spontaneous becoming of itself” (ibid., 11).  
34 Once we have explained Hegel’s strategy, his words acquire a very clear sense: “[…] mediation is 
nothing beyond self-moving selfsameness, or is reflection into self. […] The ‘I’, or becoming in general, 
this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the 
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the original presence of an immediate unity, without opposition, alienness; an 
all-evident truth without masks or deviating images; a perfect reality with no 
relation to the difference: the totality itself, the Absolute. 
However, our daily experience proves Hegel’s total overcoming of the 
opposition to be wrong. In fact, if at the beginning there was an original unity, 
why do we always begin by facing opposition and absence of truth, the 
“tragedy” of finitude? The logic by which Hegel answers (recalling a long 
tradition which starts with Plato) is the one of a nostalgic approach to origin: 
there was an origin in which everything was full, immediate, all-evident, but we 
lost it; and that explains why we always start from a structure of opposition. 
Nevertheless, since it is guaranteed that this all-evident, all-true origin exists, 
we can achieve it through a work of mediation at the end of which the 
immediacy of origin would be regained. In this way, Hegel attempts to close 
the scene. More exactly – of course, speaking on the basis of a successful 
attempt – Hegel writes:  
 
The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its 
moment together, is an immediate relationship.35 
 
Thus mediation is functional to the achievement of a last point in which 
totality (truth) is possible to be accessed immediately. The Italian 
phenomenologist Fabio Ciaramelli conveys in a poignant way that the 
framework in which Hegel’s thought moves can be considered as a  
 
[…] speculative pretension of the conclusive and immediate accessibility to 
the origin. [He adds:] The originary identity, although initially lost and hidden, 
must be nevertheless pre-supposed to the experience of division and 
dispersion: and that explains exactly why it constitutes the unique stake of the 
philosophical thought dynamic. In this way, the originary unity keeps being 
promised to the research and therefore predicts the fulfillment of the 
philosophical desire which aims to reach a theoretical transparence; 
transparence which is attainable only in the form of a speculative-dialectic 
knowledge which implies, at the end of its journey, the transparent access to 
the self-donation of the originary. It is precisely [this one, the] speculative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
immediate itself” (ibidem). In other words, the result of the phenomenology of the Spirit cannot be other 
than the beginning for the beginning is presupposed as its end: “[…] the process of becoming is rather just 
the return into simplicity. […] [And here the decisive statements follow] This result is itself a simple 
immediacy, for it is self-conscious freedom at peace with itself, which has not set the antithesis on one side 
and left it lying there, but has been reconciled with it . […] The result is the same as the beginning, only 
because the beginning is the purpose; in other words, the actual is the same as the Notion only because the 
immediate, as purpose, contains the self or pure actuality within itself. […] The self is like that immediacy 
and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself, the latter being 
similarly just the self. And the self is the sameness and simplicity that relates itself to itself” (ibid., 12). 
35 Ibid., 18 (the stress in the quote is mine). 
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nature of the knowledge of the origin: namely its capacity to regain the vision 
of the originary identity as a source hidden by every derivative knowledge.36 
  
Resuming the steps, the structure that Hegel builds is the following: he 
makes a sort of distinction between origin/beginning and start, where origin – 
the place of immediacy and all-evident truth – comes first, and start – the 
place by which we “begin” (to deal with the world: its oppositions and non-
evidences) – comes after. Now, through a path of work that faces opposition 
and alien-ation (Ent-fremdung), we are supposed to achieve the lost origin: the 
lost land becomes a promised land.  
However, this is a promise that cannot be kept, since the access to an 
immediate origin is at anytime precluded to us. As soon as the human being 
comes into the world, it experiences its being temporally/historically: namely, 
the finitude, the opposition, the impossible immediacy to the world. Thus, the 
presence of unity in the origin, of accessible totality, turns out to be only a 
hallucination of desire (as the above reported description of Ciaramelli has 
already suggested): the human being, who cannot bare the angst of its finitude, 
death as the most radical alien, passivity to time, and therefore separation 
from its origin, builds an immediately accessible origin, which is nevertheless a 
hallucinatory satisfaction of desire37: an attempt to regain a perfect state, a 
transparent (immediate) coincidence between desire and its fulfillment. Yet, as 
already anticipated, as soon as we become conscious and we start dealing with 
the real world, we experience distance and alienation: we begin from the 
difference, from time, from finitude, from the impossible appropriation of the 
alien.  
We begin from the dynamic of desire which re-proposes the structure 
own/alien: desire aims to overcome the separation in order to accomplish its 
fulfillment. However, can desire really be “satisfied” completely? Can we 
delete time and go back to the original state of perfection, immediacy between 
desire and its fulfillment? No. Not only can we not do it, but we realize also 
that this original state of perfection is a “phantom-like” projection of desire 
fulfillment. In other words, the projection is the way by which desire reacts to 
the unbearable weight of death. Death, the radical alien that cannot be 
dominated and appropriated by us, can be overcome only by a hallucination 
which establishes the primacy of eternity and the possibility of an immediate 
access to it. Along this perspective we can read the constructions of the 
speculative thought through history: from the Platonic idea and the res 
                                                          
36 F. CIARAMELLI, Intuizione intellettuale e nostalgia dell’unità originaria. Una nota su alcune pagine 
kantiane di Hegel e Heidegger, in G. Cantillo and R. Bonito Oliva (edited by), Fede e sapere. La genesi del 
pensiero del giovane Hegel, Guerini, Milano 1998, 333 (the stress in the quote is mine). On this issue see 
also B. WALDENFELS, Vielstimmigkeit der Rede. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 4, Frankfurt 
a. M. 1999, 67-87. 
37 This is one of the guiding themes of the work of F. CIARAMELLI, La distruzione del desiderio. 
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cogitans of Descartes up to the Spirit of Hegel. They all are the establishments 
of an eternal origin which rules the world, and from which the deviating masks 
of everyday experience derive and are to be considered on a lower level.  
In spite of the direct access to this original presence, we saw that an origin 
can be given only in a supplementary form, and the reason for this is the fact 
that our experience can act only on a delay basis. The words of Octavio Paz 
hit direct the point:  
 
Man is not coincident with the time, with the flow of reality. When I say: 
‘in this instant’, the instant has already passed by.38  
 
Here reappears the dynamic that we have already described: what we 
think to come after the origin is, on the contrary, what produces the origin: 
only through a delay an origin is constructed. Let’s recall the precise words by 
which Derrida introduces the structure of the supplement:  
 
La structure étrange du supplément apparaît ici: une possibilité produit à 
retardement ce à quoi elle est dite s’ajouter.39 
 
Hence, a possibility produces in delay that to which this possibility is said 
to be added. It is important to notice that Derrida speaks about this original 
structure in the same terms in which we have been stressing it until now: 
namely, as a “strange(r)” (alien).  
As we saw for the translation, at the beginning/origin there is an alien 
which we cannot dominate and appropriate, and to which therefore we are 
“asked” to respond. And since there is no final appropriation, this response 
cannot be closed; on the contrary, it is the scene where the continuous 
relationship between own and alien takes place. In other words, the response 
becomes that scene where the own and the alien are what they are only in 
relating one to the other. In Waldenfels’ words:  
 
What own and alien are, determines itself in the event of responding and 






                                                          
38 O. PAZ, El laberinto de la soledad, in ID., Obras completas, Vol. 8, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
México D. F. 1994, 189 (The translations, from Octavio Paz, from Spanish are mine).  
39 J. DERRIDA, La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de 
Husserl, PUF, Paris 1967, 99 (the stress in the quote is mine). 
40 B. WALDENFELS, Topographie, 109. 
Order as Unclosed Scene 
 
 417
3. Fiction/Tale: imagination as originary mediation 
 
The impossibility of closing the scene is also what crosses tales. Closing the 
circle, in the case of fiction, means to make the tale a function of reality, as if 
there could be an immediate access to reality able to avoid narration and 
imagination. In a way we have already seen that there is no possibility such as 
an original and immediate access to reality which would show itself – thanks to 
this access – in its full truth and all-evidence, and from which the “masks” of 
imagination/narration would derive. Fiction is not a servant of reality, but 
rather is what involves a structure of supplementarity of origin: only through 
imagination can an origin be constituted. Only through images/narration do 
we have access to reality. Octavio Paz heads in this direction:  
 
[…] the image is a desperate resort against the silence that invades us every 
time that we try to express the terrible experience of what surrounds us and of 
ourselves.41  
 
And tied to the poetical experience, the image assumes exactly the form of 
the supplement of origin, for it is – according to Paz – “a naming of that 
which, before being named, lacks properly of existence”42. Hence, that which 
is said to come after (imagination/narration), really comes first. 
Here the origin irrupts as an alien which cannot be appropriated and 
overcome; origin appears only in an original delay which we, therefore, can 
never recover. This unavoidable delay is exactly what hinders us from closing 
the circle of reality as such, from capturing it in its all-evident and 
immediately-displayed truth.  
Now, this original delay is the space inhabited by narration/imagination 
which, instead of deriving from an original presence of reality (or from a given 
totality), turns to be the only possible access to it. Examples could be several:  
1) Starting from a broader level: the reality (the effectiveness) of a ruled 
society is based on an “imagination statute”. The necessity for a society to 
represent itself, its need of a founding myth is not merely supplementary, 
rather – in Derridian terms – originally supplementary. Along this line of 
interpretation could be read not only the great Castoriadis’ thinking presented 
in his L’institution imaginaire de la société43, but also Lévi-Strauss’ idea that 
symbolism is not an effect of society, but rather society is an effect of 
symbolism44. 
                                                          
41 O. PAZ, El arco y la lira, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D. F. 1956, 111. 
42 Ibid., 157. This dynamic is that which Maurice Merleau-Ponty would call the “paradox of expression”. 
See in particular M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris 1945, 445, 
448-449; Le visible et l’invisible, Gallimard, Paris 1964, 189.  
43 See C. CASTORIADIS, L’institution imaginaire de la société, Éd. du Seuil, Paris 1975. 
44 See C. LÉVI-STRAUSS, Introduction to M. MAUSS, Sociologie et Anthropologie, PUF, Paris 1984.  
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2) Moreover, all that we know about the reality of love, hate, and ethical 
feelings is not immediately given to us, but it is what tradition, namely 
literature (imagination), displays45.  
3) A mediated access through imagination is also what rules action: I can 
really act only because I can imagine. So Ricoeur:  
 
[…] c’est dans l’imaginaire que j’essaie mon pouvoir de faire, que je 
prends la mesure du ‘je peux’. Je ne m’impute à moi-même mon propre 
pouvoir, en tant que je suis l’agent de ma propre action, qu’en le dépeignant à 
moi-même sous les traits de variations imaginatives sur le thème du ‘je 
pourrai’, voire du ‘j’aurais pu autrement, si j’avais voulu’. […] L’essentiel au 
point de vue phénoménologique est que je ne prends possession de la 
certitude immédiate de mon pouvoir qu’à travers les variations imaginatives 
qui médiatisent cette certitude.46  
 
4) The access to myself as a real identity is only possible through an 
identity which “speaks” within itself, imagines itself in dialogue; in other 
words, a narrative identity. The pages of Ricoeur on this theme are many47. 
We can read a very representative passage in a text he presented in a 
conference in Rome in 1987:  
 
According to my final hypothesis, the comprehension that each one has of 
oneself is narrative: I cannot catch myself out of the time and therefore out of 
the narration.48 
 
The exercise of imagination – just like translation and tragedy reading – is 
an exercise of delay, and by being such it is a declaration of fragility, for the 
subject realizes that it cannot dominate, and therefore fully appropriate, the 
origin. In these terms it becomes clear and meaningful what Paul Valéry says:  
 
L’étrangeté est le vrai commencement. Au commencement était 
l’étrange.49  
 
                                                          
45 In this regard P. Ricoeur writes: “Contrairement à la tradition du Cogito et à la prétention du sujet de se 
connaître lui-même par intuition immédiate, il faut dire que nous ne nous comprenons que par le grand 
détour des signes d’humanité déposés dans les œuvres de culture. Que saurions-nous de l’amour et de la 
haine, des sentiments éthiques et, en général, de tout ce que nous appelons le soi, si cela n’avait été porté au 
langage et articulé par la littérature?” (P. RICOEUR, Du texte à l’action. Essais d’herméneutique II, 
Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1986, 116). 
46 Ibid., 225 (the stress in the quote is mine). 
47 On the theme of narrative identity in P. RICOEUR see Temps et récit III. Le temps réconté, Éd. du Seuil, 
Paris 1985, 349-392; Soi-même, 137-198. 
48 I am quoting from the Italian translation: P. RICOEUR, La componente narrativa della psicoanalisi 
(1987), in “Metaxù”, n. 5, 1988, 8 (the translation from Italian is mine). 
49 P. VALÉRY, Cahiers 1894-1914, édition intégrale, vol. VI, Gallimard, Paris 1997, 85.  
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Narration/imagination, by being the sign of an impossible immediate 
access to reality in its original core, does not correspond to a “naturalization” 
of a merely initial alienness of reality, but rather it is the genuine response to 
appeal/call from an alien that can never be crossed out. Thus, imagination 
lives under the sign of an “unstableness”, says the Italian thinker Pier Aldo 
Rovatti, “tied up to the voice of the other which we narrate, which makes us 
narrate and to which in reality we ‘respond’”50.  
Imagination stands, in its fragility, against the practice of subject’s titanism, 
which, by claiming a dominion upon reality through immediate accessibility, 
negates the preeminent statute of imagination. However, what is very curious 
is that even if we follow the hypothesis of titanism we cannot avoid going 
through a kind of imagination: the paralysis of it, its mortal expression, what 
we call hallucination. In other words, the supplement of origin rules even in 
the operation of its elimination/overcoming.  
What we’ve just said in Nietzsche’s terms would sound:  
 
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; metaphors 
which are worn out and without sensuous power.51 
  
It is exactly the strange supplement of origin which silently works in 
Nietzsche’s thought when describing the relationship between reality and 
images, facts and narration – “there are no facts, but only interpretations 
(gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen)”52 – or when he 
writes:  
 
The will to semblance, to illusion, to becoming, to changing (to objective 
illusion) counts here as more profound, more original, more metaphysical 
than the will to truth, reality, being (Der Wille zum Schein, zur Illusion, zur 
Täuschung, zum Werden und Wechseln – zur objektiven Täuschung – gilt 
hier als tiefer, ursprünglicher, metaphysischer als der Wille zur Wahrheit, zur 
Wirklichkeit, zum Sein).53 
 
The issues of constant translation and inhabiting the opened scene raised 
by this essay are also not at all far from the experience of perspectivism 
proposed by Nietzsche: he speaks about a navigation, surrounded by an 
                                                          
50 P.A. ROVATTI, Abitare la distanza. Per un’etica del linguaggio, Feltrinelli, Milano 1994, 135 (the 
translation from Italian is mine). 
51 F. NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, engl. trans. by Walter Kaufmann, Viking 
Penguin Inc, New York 1976. 
52 F. NIETZSCHE, Nachlaß 1885-1887, in ID., Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by G. Colli und M. 
Montinari, vol. 12, de Gruyter, München 1999 (new edition), 7 [60], 315 (The translation into English from 
the Nachlaß is mine). 
53 F. NIETZSCHE, Nachlaß 1887-1889, in ID., Kritische Studienausgabe, vol.13, 17 [3], 522 (the stress in 
the quote is mine). 
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“infinite horizon”, which does not lead to a land and cannot go back to any 
land, and this is because there is no longer any land, any present origin54. This 
no land metaphor – which does not allow any nostalgic attitude – cannot 
indicate other than the statute of alienness: the root of our fragile being in the 
world. 
Against this fragility and ontological delay stands every titanic attempt of 
immediate access to origin. Immediacy as the most exasperated form of hurry 
– hurry to delete time, to eternalize: e.g. to possess truth, to avoid death. As 
the great Cuban singer (and poet) Silvio Rodríguez poignantly sings:  
 
Siempre vale la agonía de la prisa / aunque se llene de sillas la verdad.55 
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